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Abstract There are many interesting Knowledge Representation questions surround-
ing rule languages for the Semantic Web. The most basic one is of course: which kind of
rules should be used and how do they integrate with existing Description Logics? Sim-
ilar questions have already been addressed in the field of Logic Programming, where
one particular answer has been provided by the language of FO(ID). FO(ID) is an
extension of first-order logic with a rule-based representation for inductive definitions.
By offering a general integration of first-order logic and Logic Programs, it also induces
a particular way of extending Description Logics with rules. The goal of this paper is
to investigate this integration and discover whether there are interesting extensions of
DL with rules that can be arrived at by imposing appropriate restrictions on the highly
expressive FO(ID).
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, Description Logics (DL) have emerged as an important Knowl-
edge Representation (KR) technology. More recently, they have also had a significant
impact on industry, most notably with the adoption of OWL as a W3C standard. In
current research, we find a trend to investigate extensions of OWL with rules (e.g.
[14]), and, in fact, the hierarchical Semantic Web architecture already prescribes a rule
layer on top of the ontology layer formed by OWL. There are a number of interesting
KR questions surrounding this topic.
– Which kind of rules are to be used? There are numerous kinds of rules known in
the literature (inference rules, rewrite rules, . . . ), with subtle differences between
them.
– What precisely do this kind of rules mean? It should be possible to explain exactly
the information content of such a rule and, obviously, this explanation should be
consistent with the formal semantics of the rules.
Joost Vennekens
Campus De Nayer, Hogeschool voor Wetenschap & Kunst, Sint Katelijne Waver, Belgium
Marc Denecker · Maurice Bruynooghe
Dept. of Computer Science, K.U. Leuven, Belgium
2– How do the rules complement DL? We should be able to clearly indicate how the
rules extend the class of knowledge that can be represented by the logic.
In this paper, we will present one particular answer to these questions, based on
the language of FO(ID), a general integration of classical first-order logic (FO) and
Logic Programming (LP). Conceptually, FO(ID) is an extension of FO with inductive
definitions. To explain, let us consider the following example of an inductive definition,
taken from the wikipedia page on the topic1.
The prime numbers can be defined as consisting of:
– 2, the smallest prime;
– each positive integer which is not evenly divisible by any of the primes
smaller than itself.
FO(ID) offers a formal syntax for representing such an inductive definition as a set of
definitional rules:(
Prime(2)←
∀x Prime(x)← x > 2 ∧ ¬∃y y < x ∧ Prime(y) ∧Divisible(x, y)
)
In natural language, an inductive definition consists of a set of cases in which the defined
relation, Prime in this case, holds. Each of these cases corresponds to a definitional rule
in the formal syntax of FO(ID). We remark that the ‘←’-symbol in the above expression
therefore conveys more meaning than the normal material implication of FO: it not
only states that certain numbers are prime, but also that no number can be prime
unless its “primeness” can be constructively derived by applying the two rules. This
additional meaning of such a rule is formalized in FO(ID) using the (parameterized)
well-founded model construction from Logic Programming [23]. It was argued in [5]
that this formal construction correctly captures the common-sense meaning of such a
definition, as it is understood throughout mathematics.
The “job” of an inductive definition is, obviously, to define certain relation(s) (e.g.,
Prime/1) in terms of some other relation(s) (e.g., < /2 and Divisible/2). In this sense,
it has the same semantic status as an FO formula: it expresses a relation between a
number of predicates, which may or may not be satisfied by a given interpretation for
these predicates. Based on this observation, FO(ID) integrates inductive definitions
into FO: a formula of FO(ID) is either a regular FO formula or an inductive definition.
In this way, FO is extended with a particular form of rules, namely, definitional rules,
whose meaning is that each such rule represent a “case” of a particular inductive defi-
nition. This enlarges the expressive power of the logic: it is well-known that inductive
definitions, such as that of transitive closure, cannot be expressed in FO.
The integration of FO and LP offered by FO(ID) has a number of properties that
are quite appealing from the point of view of extending DL with rules:
– as opposed to the many hybrid approaches that exist, FO(ID) offers a strong se-
mantic integration of FO and LP;
– in this integration, both components have a clear knowledge representation “task”:
the LP component is to be used to define concepts, whereas the FO component can
be used to assert additional properties of both the defined concepts and concepts
for which no definition is provided;
1 http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive definition
3– FO(ID) is particularly natural from a DL perspective: the ability to properly define
concepts is already considered to be an important and characteristic feature of DL2,
and FO(ID) essentially just extends it to definitions that cannot be represented by
a normal FO equivalence.
These properties make FO(ID) an interesting source of inspiration for extending DL
with rules. In particular, because it contains full FO and allows general FO formulas
in the bodies of its definitional rules, it is well-suited to serve as an upperbound, from
which we can derive meaningful extensions of DL with rules, by imposing appropriate
restrictions on it. We believe that, in general, this is better than the opposite approach
of gradually extending a small tractable language into a more expressive one, since it
allows the trade-off between expressivity and complexity to be made more consciously
and informedly, which reduces the risk of creating an ad hoc language, whose boundaries
are decided more by coincidence than design. In the rest of this paper, we will therefore
follow this methodology, by defining two fragments of FO(ID) that are interesting DL
rule languages.
Part of this paper has been presented at the European Semantic Web Conference
(ESWC) 2009 [24].
2 Preliminaries: FO(ID)
This section summarizes the definition of FO(ID) as found in [5]. A definitional rule is
an expression of the form:
∀x P (x)← ϕ, (1)
with
– P/n a predicate (where the notation P/n means that the arity of P is n);
– x a tuple of n variables, not necessarily distinct;
– ϕ an FO formula.
Let us emphasize that expression (1) is just a particular syntax for writing down a
definitional rule with these three components. In particular, the symbol ‘←’, which we
call definitional implication, is not the material implication of FO (which we denote as
‘⇐’); instead, it is a new symbol, which is used exclusively to write down definitional
rules. Also the universal quantifier in expression (1) is simply part of the notation used
for definitional rules.
For a definitional rule r of form (1), we refer to P (x) as the head of r, denoted
head(r), and to the formula ϕ as its body, denoted body(r).
Syntactically, a definition in FO(ID) is a finite set of definitional rules, enclosed by
curly braces {}. An FO(ID) formula is any expression that can be formed by combining
atoms and definitions, using the standard FO connectives and quantifiers. So, the
syntactical status of a definition in FO(ID) is the same as that of a regular FO atom:
it is itself a formula, and more complex formulas can be built from it. A definitional
rule in FO(ID), on the other hand, has the same semantical status as a term in FO:
even though it may already be a complex expression, it is itself not yet a formula.
2 For instance, the DL handbook [1] has the following to say about DL’s ‘≡’-connective:
“This form of definition is much stronger than the ones used in other kinds of representations
of knowledge, which typically impose only necessary conditions; the strength of this kind of
declaration is usually considered a characteristic feature of DL knowledge bases.”
4A definitional rule may only appear as part of a definition (i.e., inside curly braces,
together with zero or more other definitional rules), whereas a definition as a whole
may appear wherever an FO atom is allowed, as long as it not inside another definition.
The meaning of the FO connectives is standard; e.g., a disjunction ∆1 ∨∆2 of two
definitions ∆1 and ∆2 holds if and only if ∆1 holds or ∆2 holds. We therefore only
need to define the semantics of a definition (i.e., what does it mean, precisely, to say
that a definition ∆ “holds”?) in order to define the semantics of FO(ID) in full.
Let us first recall some well-known semantical concepts. An interpretation S for a
vocabulary Σ consists of a non-empty domain D, a mapping from each function symbol
f/n to an n-ary function fS on D, and a mapping from each predicate symbol P/n
to a relation PS ⊆ Dn. A three-valued interpretation ν is the same as a two-valued
one, except that it maps each predicate symbol P/n to a function P ν from Dn to the
set of truth values {t, f ,u}. Such a ν assigns a truth value to each logical atom P (c),
namely P ν(cν1 , . . . , c
ν
n). This assignment can be extended to an assignment ν(ϕ) of a
truth value to each formula ϕ, using the standard Kleene truth tables for the logical
connectives:
ϕ,ψ t, t t, f t, u u, f u, u f, f
ϕ ∨ ψ t t t u u f
ϕ t u f
¬ϕ f u t
and so on. An existential quantification is of course similar to a disjunction, in the
sense that ∃x ϕ(x) is t if for some tuple d ∈ D, ϕ(d) is t, and otherwise it is u as soon
as some ϕ(d) is u; therefore, ∃x ϕ(x) is f only if all ϕ(d) are f.
The three truth values can be partially ordered according to precision:
u ≤p t and u ≤p f .
This order induces a precision order ≤p on interpretations: ν ≤p ν′ if for each predicate
P/n and tuple d ∈ Dn, P ν(d) ≤p P ν
′
(d). For a predicate P/n, a tuple d ∈ Dn and
a truth value v ∈ {t, f ,u}, we denote by ν[P (d)/v] the three-valued interpretation ν′
that coincides with ν on all symbols apart from P/n, and for which P ν
′
maps d to v
and all other tuples d′ to P ν(d′). We also extend this notation to ν[U/v] with U a set
of such pairs of predicates Pi and tuples di.
Our goal is to define when a (two-valued) interpretation S is a model of a definition
∆. We call the predicates that appear in the head of a rule of ∆ its defined predicates
and we denote the set of all these by Def(∆); all other symbols are called open and the
set of open symbols is written Op(∆). The purpose of ∆ is now to define the predicates
Def(∆) in terms of the symbols Op(∆), i.e., we should assume the interpretation of
Op(∆) as given and try to construct a corresponding interpretation for Def(∆). Let
O be the restriction S|Op(∆) of S to the open symbols. We are now going to construct
sequences of three-valued interpretations (νOα )0≤α, each of which extends O; we will
use the limit of these sequences to interpret Def(∆).
– νO0 assigns P
O : Dn → {t, f} to each P ∈ Op(∆) and the constant function that
maps each tuple d to u to each P ∈ Def(∆);
– νOi+1 is related to ν
O
i in one of two ways:
– either νOi+1 = ν
O
i [P (d)/t], such that ∆ contains a rule ∀x P (x) ← ϕ(x) with
νOi (ϕ(d)) = t;
– or νOi+1 = ν
O
i [U/f ], where U is any unfounded set, meaning that it consists of
pairs of predicates P/n and tuples d ∈ Dn for which P νOi (d) = u, and for each
rule ∀x P (x)← ϕ(x), we have that νOi+1(ϕ(d)) = f .
5– For each limit ordinal λ, νOλ is the least upper bound w.r.t. ≤p of all νOδ for which
δ < λ.
The intuition behind the concept of an unfounded set U is that we can safely conclude
that all P (d) ∈ U are false, because doing so will falsify all conditions under which
we would be able to derive that one of them is true. We call such a sequence (νOα )0≤α
a well-founded induction of ∆ in O. Each such sequence eventually reaches a limit
νOβ . It was shown in [5] that all sequences reach the same limit, and that this limit
is precisely the well-founded model of ∆ given O [23]. It is now this νOβ that tell us
how to interpret the defined predicates. To be more precise, we define that, for each
two-valued interpretation S:
S |= ∆ iff S|Def(∆) = νOβ |Def(∆), with O = S|Op(∆).
This tells us when a definition ∆ is satisfied in a structure S. The semantics of full
FO(ID), in which definitions and atoms can be combined using the standard FO con-
nectives, is now simply that which is obtained by adding the usual recursive cases for
the connectives (e.g., S |= ϕ ∧ ψ if S |= ϕ and S |= ψ, and so). Note that if there is
some predicate P/n and d ∈ Dn such that P νβ (d) is still u, then the definition has no
models extending O. Intuitively, this means that, for this particular interpretation of
its open symbols, ∆ does not manage to unambiguously define the predicates Def(∆),
due to some non well-founded use of negation.
In the rest of this paper, we will only consider relational vocabularies, that is, there
will be no function symbols of arity > 0.
3 From FO(ID) to DL(ID)
As a language that extends full FO, FO(ID) is too expressive to serve as a DL itself. In
this section, we discuss the problem of restricting FO(ID) to a smaller, more DL-like
language. In doing this, it is important to be clear about the goals we are trying to
achieve. DLs themselves are fragments of FO that are interesting for essentially two
reasons:
– they are decidable;
– they are tailored towards a concept-centric modeling style, which they support by
means of an intuitive syntax sugar that hides away many of the complexities of
FO.
The first of these properties is about computation, whereas the second concerns knowl-
edge representation. To a certain extent, they are therefore orthogonal concerns.
Most of our attention in this paper will go to the knowledge representation issue,
simply because we feel that it comes first. If a logic is to be used at all, for whatever
purpose, then theories will have to be written in it. If this is difficult, for instance
because the language is too complex or because the meaning of its statements is unclear,
then it is unlikely the language will enjoy enduring success, no matter how efficient
certain inference task for it might be. Therefore, a primary goal of designing a rule
language for DL should be to ensure that it provides a clean and coherent integration
of rules into DL, which is easy to understand for those with a working knowledge of
DL.
6This does not mean that decidability is unimportant, but in the end it is of sec-
ondary nature, since also undecidable languages can have interesting uses. Indeed,
decidability is, by definition, only relevant if the goal is to perform deductive inference
(i.e., to decide whether, for formulas ϕ and ψ, it is the case that ϕ |= ψ, in the sense
that each model of ϕ is also a model of ψ) in an unknown or infinite domain. Or, to
put things more formally:
– given an FO theory T and an FO formula ϕ, it is undecidable whether for all
structures S, it holds that S |= T implies S |= ϕ;
– however, given a finite set D, an FO theory T and an FO formula ϕ, it is decidable
(with data complexity in co-NP and combined complexity in PSPACE) whether
for all structures S such that the domain of S is D, it holds that S |= T implies
S |= ϕ;
When we go from FO to FO(ID), both of these theorems still hold. This is important,
because the second situation arises in numerous interesting applications. For instance,
when reasoning in the context of a particular database, we only want to consider
the domain D consisting of all the objects in the database, as DB querying systems
indeed typically do. Similarly, if the goal is to query some data from Semantic Web
sites, we often only want to consider those objects about which we are able to retrieve
information; for instance, if we are looking for the cheapest flight from Athens to Rome,
it does us little good to be told that an unknown carrier might be offering a flight for
$1 that is not advertised anywhere. A second example is that for many combinatorial
problems, the domain is given as part of the specific problem instance that is to be
solved; e.g., in graph colouring, D would be the set of nodes, which is fixed once we get
a specific graph to colour. Moreover, even when the domain is not known, there might
still be approximate algorithms, that are able to derive useful information without
guarantees of completeness.
We will therefore now first present a fragment of FO(ID) that allows a DL-like
syntactic sugar and offers a DL-like modeling methodology. Afterwards, we will turn
to the topic of inference.
4 A fragment of FO(ID): ALCI(ID)
The goal of this section is to present a fragment of FO(ID), that supports a DL-
like modeling style. This will be an extension of the Description Logic ALCI. More
expressive logics, such as SHOIN (D) which underlies OWL-DL, can be extended in
the same way; we restrict to ALCI merely for simplicity.
Let us first briefly recallALCI. We start from a set of unary predicates {A1, A2, . . .}
called (atomic) concepts and a set of binary predicates {B1, B2, . . .} called (atomic)
roles. From the atomic concepts, we build more complex ones using the connectives unionsq,
u, ¬, ∃ and ∀; their meaning can be inductively defined by the mapping to FO given
in Fig. 1. A role is either an atomic role B or its inverse B−, as in Fig. 2. We will use
the naming convention that, for a role R, R(x, y) is to be read as “x is an R of y”.
This is reflected in the cases for ∃ and ∀ in Fig. 1, which express that x belongs to the
concept ∃R.C or ∀R.C, respectively, if there exists a y that is an R of x such that y
belongs to C or if for each y that is an R of x, it holds that y belongs to C. We will
write ⊥ and > to denote the empty and universal concept, respectively.
A TBox then consists of a set of inclusions and equivalences as in Fig. 3.
7C 〈C〉(x)
A A(x) with A an atomic concept
C1 u C2 〈C1〉(x) ∧ 〈C2〉(x) with C1, C2 concepts
C1 unionsq C2 〈C1〉(x) ∨ 〈C2〉(x) with C1, C2 concepts
¬C ¬〈C〉(x) with C a concept
∀R.C ∀y 〈R〉(y, x)⇒ 〈C〉(y) with R a role and C a concept
∃R.C ∃y 〈R〉(y, x) ∧ 〈C〉(y) with R a role and C a concept
Fig. 1 A concept C of ALCI represents a unary formula 〈C〉(x) of FO.
R 〈R〉(x, y)
B B(x, y) with B an atomic role
B− B(y, x) with B an atomic role
Fig. 2 A role R of ALCI represents a binary formula 〈R〉(x, y) of FO.
ϕ 〈ϕ〉
C1 v C2 ∀x 〈C1〉(x)⇒ 〈C2〉(x) with C1, C2 concepts
C1 ≡ C2 ∀x 〈C1〉(x)⇔ 〈C2〉(x) with C1, C2 concepts
Fig. 3 A statement ϕ in a TBox correspond to an FO sentence 〈ϕ〉.
R 〈R〉(x, y)
R1 uR2 〈R1〉(x, y) ∧ 〈R2〉(x, y) with R1, R2 roles
R1 unionsqR2 〈R1〉(x, y) ∨ 〈R2〉(x, y) with R1, R2 roles
¬R ¬〈R〉(x, y) with R a role
R1.R2 ∃z 〈R1〉(x, z) ∧ 〈R2〉(z, y) with R1, R2 roles
C1 × C2 C1(x) ∧ C2(y) with C1, C2 concepts
Fig. 4 Additional ways of constructing roles.
We now form the language ALCI(ID) by extending ALCI. First, we add the con-
nectives in Fig. 4 for constructing more complex roles: the first three are the obvious
analogues of the connectives for concepts, the fourth takes the join of two roles, and
the last one takes the Cartesian product of two concepts. Second, we add two new
connectives for representing inductive definitions. The first is the symbol ‘
.
=’, which is
conceptually the same as ‘≡’, with the difference that it also works for inductive defi-
nitions. Formally, it is defined as an abbreviation for an FO(ID) definition containing
a single rule, as shown in the first two entries of Fig. 5.
For instance, we can define the concept of an uncle as the brother of a parent:
Uncle
.
= Brother.Parent
This abbreviates the FO(ID) definition:
{∀x, y Uncle(x, y)← ∃z Brother(x, z) ∧ Parent(z, y)}
Such a non-inductive definition (i.e., the role/concept on the left-hand side does not
appear in the right-hand side) is equivalent to a regular FO equivalence:
∀x, y Uncle(x, y)⇔ ∃z Brother(x, z) ∧ Parent(z, y).
However, ‘
.
=’ can also correctly represent inductive definitions. For instance, we can
define the role Ancestor as the transitive closure of Parent, by saying that an Ancestor
is either a Parent or the Parent of an Ancestor:
Ancestor
.
= Parent unionsq Parent.Ancestor
8ϕ 〈ϕ〉
R1
.
= R2 {∀x, y 〈R1〉(x, y)← 〈R2〉(x, y)} with R1, R2 roles
C1
.
= C2 {∀x 〈C1〉(x)← 〈C2〉(x)} with C1, C2 concepts
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} {〈ϕ1〉, . . . , 〈ϕn〉} with ϕ1, . . . , ϕn definitional rules (Fig.6)
Fig. 5 A definition ϕ in ALCI(ID) corresponds to a definition 〈ϕ〉 in FO(ID).
ϕ 〈ϕ〉
R1 ← R2 ∀x, y 〈R1〉(x, y)← 〈R2〉(x, y) with R1, R2 roles
C1 ← C2 ∀x 〈C1〉(x)← 〈C2〉(x) with C1, C2 concepts
Fig. 6 A definitional rule ϕ in ALCI(ID) corresponds to a definitional rule 〈ϕ〉 in FO(ID).
Because of the translation to FO(ID), this too has the correct semantics. Therefore,
‘
.
=’ can be used instead of a transitive closure construct such as ·+ or the reflexive-
transitive closure ·∗ of e.g. [16]; it can also replace non-nested uses of the explicit least
fixpoint operator µ.
Whereas
.
= defines a concept by a single rule, it is convenient to also be able to
define a concept by a set of rules. For this purpose we introduce a new connective← to
represent a definitional rule and allow sets of such rules, again enclosed in curly braces,
as statements in our language; this is shown in Fig. 5 and 6. For instance, extending
the notion of an uncle to also include uncles-by-marriage, we could then define this
concept by saying that an uncle is
– either a brother of a parent;
– or a husband of an aunt.
We can write this down in ALCI(ID) as:(
Uncle← Brother.Parent
Uncle← Husband.Aunt
)
This abbreviates the following definition in FO(ID):(
∀x, y Uncle(x, y)← ∃z Brother(x, z) ∧ Parent(z, y)
∀x, y Uncle(x, y)← ∃z Husband(x, z) ∧Aunt(z, y)
)
In general, if a definition contains multiple rules with the same predicate in the
head, these can always be replaced by a single rule whose body is the disjunction of
the bodies of the original rules. Therefore, we could rephrase the above definition of
Uncle as
Uncle
.
= Brother.Parent unionsqHusband.Aunt
However, this loses the natural case-based structure of the definition, i.e., it makes it
more difficult to see that there are actually two separate sufficient conditions, which
together also form a necessary condition. Moreover, the rule-based format is also more
elaboration tolerant, since rules can more easily be added or removed. For instance, a
bank might define the class of persons eligible for a loan as consisting of people with a
large income, people who own a house and people with a good credit history; each time
the bank now tightens or relaxes its policy, certain rules would have to be removed or
added to this definition.
The rule-based representation is also more general than ‘
.
=’, since it allows defini-
tions by simultaneous induction as well. For instance, given a two-player game whose
91 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
1 6 7 12
5 10 11
9
Fig. 7 The result of selecting ball 2.
move tree is described by the role Parent, we can define the nodes in which I move
and the nodes in which my opponent moves by the following simultaneous induction
(assuming I start): 8><>:
HisMove←∃Parent.MyMove
MyMove←∃Parent.HisMove
MyMove←∀Parent.⊥
9>=>;
5 An Example
In this section, we will illustrate the new features offered by ALCI(ID). Our example
concerns a simple game, in which the player is presented a grid of coloured balls. He
makes a move by selecting one of these balls. The effect of this is that the entire colour-
group to which the ball belongs disappears; the remaining balls then fall down, yielding
the next position of the game, as depicted in Fig. 7. The goal of the game is to remove
all balls from the grid in such a way as to score as many points as possible. What we
will do here is construct an ALCI(ID) theory that describes the effect of a single move
of this game.
To make things more concrete, let us fix a representation for a state of the game.
We represent the grid by roles Up and Left, both with the obvious meaning. The
starting grid in Fig. 7, for instance, would correspond to the following interpretations:
Up ={(5, 1), (9, 5), (6, 2), (10, 6), (7, 3),
(11, 7), (8, 4), (12, 8)};
Left ={(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (5, 6), (6, 7),
(7, 8), (9, 10), (10, 11), (11, 12)}.
We represent the player’s move by a concept Chosen; the move made in Fig. 7 would
correspond to Chosen = {2}. Our goal is now to define roles Up′ and Left′, represent-
ing the next state of the game.
We first define some useful auxiliary roles and concepts. We begin by defining the
role Above as the transitive closure of Up. One ball is above another if it is either
directly on top of it, or on top of a ball that is already above it:
Above
.
= Up unionsq Up.Above
A ball is next to another ball —the role NextTo— if it is either to the left, to the
right, underneath, or on top of it:
NextTo
.
= Left unionsqRight unionsq Up unionsqDown
10
Of course, the roles Right and Down are the inverses of, respectively Left and Up:
Right
.
= Left− Down .= Up−
We remark that of these four definitions, Above is defined inductively, while the others
are not. However, in ALCI(ID) this difference hardly matters: all four definitions have
the same “look and feel”.
The concept Disappears describes the balls that disappear after the move. These
are the chosen ball itself and all balls belonging to the same colour-group:
Disappears
.
= Chosen unionsq ∃InColourGroup.Chosen
The role InColourGroup expresses that balls are in the same colour group, i.e., they
are connected through a sequence of balls of the same colour:(
InColourGroup← SameColour uNextTo
InColourGroup← InColourGroup uNextTo
)
Here, we use the ← connective to separate the base case and the inductive step of this
definition; the same could be done with our earlier definition of Above. Both forms are
equivalent, so it is up to the modeler to decide whether he prefers to use multiple rules
or a single rule with a disjunction in the body. The obvious guideline is to consider
how you would write the definition in a natural language text: if you would be inclined
to use a bulleted list, then use multiple rules; if you would write it as running text
instead (using an “either . . . or . . . ”), use a single rule.
Two balls have the same colour if the colour of one is also that of the other:
SameColour
.
= HasColour.HasColour−
Having now defined which balls disappear, we define in the concept Remains the
remaining balls as the complement thereof:
Remains
.
= ¬Disappears
We now define the role Above′, i.e., the “above”-relation as it will be in the next state.
This will hold for any two remaining balls that were originally above each other:
Above′ .= Above u (Remains×Remains)
We can now define the role Up′ as the intransitive relation of which Above′ is the
transitive closure:
Up′ .= Above′ u ¬(Above′.Above′)
We define an auxiliary concept OnGround′ as consisting of those balls that will form
the bottom row in the new situation:
OnGround′ .= Remains u ¬∃Above−.Remains
All that remains now is to define the role Left′. Let us first define the role InLeftColumn
which describes when a ball x is in the column to the left of some other ball y. Re-
gardless of which of the two columns is higher, the following three cases cover all such
situations:
– x is to the left y;
11
– x is to the left of a ball z 6= y that is in the same column as y;
– x is in the same column as a ball z 6= y that is to the left of y.
Even though this definition is not inductive, it is still a nice fit with the case-based
structure of definitions in ALCI(ID).8><>:
InLeftColumn←Left
InLeftColumn←Left.(Above unionsqAbove−)
InLeftColumn←(Above unionsqAbove−).Left
9>=>;
We now define Left′ as consisting of all pairs of balls such that (1) one ball is in
the column to the left of the other, and (2) both are on the same height:
Left′ .= InLeftColumn| {z }
(1)
u ((OnGround′ ×OnGround′) unionsq Up′.(Left′.Up′−))| {z }
(2)
Note that this too is an inductive definition, which proceeds along the rows of the grid:
the base case is the bottom row, whereas the inductive case defines that x is to the left
of y in the following situation:
x y
This concludes our representation of the game. As this example shows, ALCI(ID)
can represent many different kinds of definitions (case-based definitions, non-inductive
definitions, monotone inductive definitions, non-monotone inductive definitions) in a
uniform way in, leading to a clean and coherent language.
6 Inference in ALCI(ID)
In this section, we discuss some issues related to inference in ALCI(ID). Our first result
is that this language is, in general, undecidable.
Theorem 1 ALCI(ID) is undecidable. It is also not even semi-decidable.
Proof We will prove this result by showing that ALCI(ID) can express tiling problems:
a tiling problem consists of a set of tiles D and relations H,V ⊆ D × D describing
which tiles match horizontally and vertically, respectively. It is well-known that it is
not even semi-decidable whether the first quadrant of the plane can be tiled by a given
set of tiles (i.e., whether it is possible to assign to each point (i, j) ∈ N2 one of the tiles
in D such that all horizontally/vertically adjacent tiles match, as dictated by the sets
H and V , respectively) [4]. Therefore, it suffices to show that for each tiling problem
(D,H, V ), we can construct an ALCI(ID) theory T , such that T is satisfiable if and
only if (D,H, V ) can indeed tile this quadrant. We construct T as follows.
For each tile i ∈ D, we have a role Tilei, which is intended to hold for all (x, y)
such that square (x, y) is tiled by i. We use the role Succ to represent the successor
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relation of the natural numbers. The theory then is:
> v ∃Succ.> (each number has a successor)(
Greater ← Succ
Greater ← Succ.Greater
)
(transitive closure of Succ)
⊥×⊥ w Greater− uGreater (Greater is anti-symmetric)
>×> v unionsqiTilei (the tiles cover all positions)
Tilei u Tilej v ⊥×⊥, for all i 6= j (at most one tile per point)
Tilei.Succ v unionsq(i,j)∈V Tilej (tiles match vertically)
Tile−i .Succ v unionsq(i,j)∈HTile−j (tiles match horizontally)
However, the undecidability of ALCI(ID) does not imply that the logic is unsuited
for all computational applications. In particular, we want to call attention to the fol-
lowing interesting inference task of model expansion.
6.1 Model expansion
[17] considered the inference task of model expansion for FO(ID): given an interpre-
tation S for some subset Σ0 of the alphabet Σ of a theory T , extend S with an
interpretation for the remaining symbols Σ \Σ0, such that the resulting interpretation
is a model of T . Here, S is required to have a finite domain. Note that, in general, a
model expansion problem may have many different solutions, because even though S
has to fix the domain of discourse, it does not fix the interpretation of Σ \Σ0 in this
domain, but only restrains it to satisfy T . This form of inference is decidable for full
FO(ID) and in fact captures the complexity class NP.
To illustrate the usefulness of this inference task, let us consider again the example
of the previous section. Here, we defined the next state of a game (Left′ and Up′) in
terms of its old state (Left and Up) and a given move (Chosen). We can therefore
compute a new state of the game by performing model expansion on the structure S
for the alphabet Σ0 = {Left, Up, Chosen}. Because our representation of the game
defines all of its predicates except the ones in Σ0, this computation can actually be
done in polynomial time.
The IDP-system3 implements the task of model expansion for FO(ID). A program
transforming ALCI(ID) syntax to input for this system is available.4 Together, these
two programs are able to use our formalization of Section 5 to compute state transitions
for this game. It is not hard to extend this to a method of determining whether a given
game has a solution (i.e., a sequence of moves that removes all balls). However, this
is only possible because there is an upperbound on the number of moves that can
be made—since every move removes at least one ball, the possible length of a game
is limited by the number of balls. For games that might last infinitely long, such as
the fifteen puzzle, model expansion cannot determine whether a solution exists (at
least, not unless clever tricks are used); it can only say whether, for some fixed n,
a solution exists in n steps or less. In this respect, the model expansion system is
similar to a lightweight verification system such as Alloy.5 To perform inference in
3 http://www.cs.kuleuven.be/∼dtai/krr/software/idp.html
4 http://www.cs.kuleuven.be/∼joost/alc id.tar.gz
5 http://alloy.mit.edu/
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unbounded domains, as a heavyweight verification method would do, more general
forms of deduction are needed. The next section presents a fragment of ALCI(ID) in
which general deduction is decidable.
6.2 Guarded ALCI(ID)
As discussed, there are interesting problems that can be solved by reasoning in a fixed,
finite domain, and for which the undecidability of FO(ID) is therefore not a problem.
However, since we would not want to claim that this covers all potential applications,
this section will develop a decidable fragment of ALCI(ID).
This fragment will be based on the guarded fragment of FO. We recall that an
FO formula ψ is guarded if every one of its quantified subformulas is either of the
form ∃x G(x,y) ∧ ϕ(x,y) or ∀x G(x,y) ⇒ ϕ(x,y), where G(x,y) is an atom, called
the guard, such that the free variables free(ϕ(x,y)) are a subset of free(G(x,y)).
There also exists a loosely guarded fragment, which allows the guards G(x,y) to be
conjunctions of atoms, rather than simply atoms, on condition that each quantified
variable x appears together with every other variable of x ∪ y in at least one of the
atoms.
In [10], the loosely guarded fragment of FO was extended to FO(LFP). We recall
that FO(LFP) extends FO with a least-fixpoint construct that can be used to represent
monotone induction. This works as follows.
In general, suppose that ϕ(x) is a formula with n free variables x. Together with
an interpretation I for its vocabulary, such a formula defines a set Sat(ϕ, I) of tuples
from dom(I) that satisfy it:
Sat(ϕ, I) = {d ∈ dom(I)n | I |= ϕ(d)}.
Now, let us suppose that ϕ contains some predicate P of arity precisely n, which is not
interpreted by I. By supplementing I with an interpretation J for the predicate P , we
can obtain the set of tuples Sat(ϕ, I ∪ J). This set of tuples can now serve as a new
interpretation J ′ for the predicate P . That is, ϕ and I define the following operator
F Iϕ,P on interpretations J of the predicate P :
F Iϕ,P (J) = Sat(ϕ, I ∪ J).
If the predicate P appears only positively in the formula ϕ, this operator is monotone
and, therefore, has a least fixpoint.
The logic FO(LFP) is now obtained by extending FO with the following kind of
fixpoint expression:
[lfpP (ϕ)](t). (2)
Here, P is a predicate of arity n, ϕ is a formula with n free variables, and t is a tuple
of n terms; the predicate P is only allowed to appear positively in the formula ϕ. The
semantics of such an expression is that it is satisfied by an interpretation I and variable
assignment σ if and only if tI,σ belongs to the least fixpoint of the operator F Iϕ,P .
For instance, FO(LFP) allows us to express that a pair (A,B) belongs to the
transitive closure of a relation R as:
[lfpT (x,y)R(x, y) ∨ ∃z T (x, z) ∧ T (z, y)](A,B)
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To better bring out the similarity to FO(ID), we will also write a fixpoint expression
of form (2) in the following syntax:
[lfp{∀x P (x)← ϕ}](t).
Gra¨del et al. define the following (loosely) guarded fragment of FO(LFP).
Definition 1 (paraphrased from [10]) The (loosely) guarded fragment of FO(LFP)
is defined by extending the (loosely) guarded fragment of FO with the following rule for
constructing (loosely) guarded fixpoint formulas: a fixpoint formula [lfpP (x)ϕ(x)](t) is
(loosely) guarded if and only if ϕ is a (loosely) guarded formula such that P does not
appear in any of its guards.
They then go on to prove the following result:
Theorem 2 ([10]) The satisfiability problem for (loosely) guarded fixpoint logic is
2Exptime-complete.
We now define a similar (loosely) guarded fragment of FO(ID). First, we define the
concept of a (loosely) guarded definition, as an analogue of a (loosely) guarded fixpoint
formula. We will restrict attention to definitions that are total, i.e., for which the limit
of each induction sequence is always two-valued (regardless of the interpretation of the
open predicates). There is an easy syntactic criterion that suffices to ensure totality.
Let us say that a predicate P depends on a predicate Q in definition ∆ if there exists
a sequence of predicates P1, . . . , Pn with P = P1 and Pn = Q, such that for each i,
∆ contains a rule with Pi in the head and Pi+1 in the body; we say that P depends
negatively on Q if for at least one i, Pi+1 appears negatively in the body of the rule
for Pi. As long as there are now no two predicates P and Q (where it is allowed
that P = Q) that depend negatively on each other, the definition ∆ is guaranteed to
be total. In practice, it is quite rare to encounter definitions that do not satisfy this
criterion.
Definition 2 A definition ∆ of FO(ID) is (loosely) guarded if:
– for each of its rules ∀x P (x)← ψ, it holds that ψ is a (loosely) guarded formula;
– none of the defined predicates Def(∆) are used as guards;
– no defined predicates depend negatively on each other (as defined above).
Our method for proving the decidability of (loosely) guarded FO(ID) will be to
present a translation from FO(ID) to FO(LFP) and then show that it maps the (loosely)
guarded fragment of the former into the (loosely) guarded fragment of the latter. Be-
cause it will ease notation, we will actually present our transformation using simultane-
ous least-fixpoint logic FO(SLFP). As shown in, e.g., [7], FO(SLFP) can be reduced to
regular FO(LFP), by increasing the arities of the fixpoint predicate(s). Again, for con-
sistency with FO(ID) notation, we will use a rule-based form to write such simultaneous
fixpoint formulas, as is also done in, e.g., [15]. To be more concrete, a simultaneous
least fixpoint expression is of the form:
[lfpPiS](t) (3)
where S is now a set of fixpoint rules:
S =
8><>:
∀x1 P1(x1)← ϕ1
· · ·
∀xn Pn(xn)← ϕn
9>=>; (4)
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Here, each ϕi is a formula with the tuple xi as free variables, such that no predicate
Pj (including Pi) appears negatively in it. Such an expression induces an operator
that now no longer works on interpretations of a single predicate P , but rather on
interpretations of all the Pi simultaneously. That is, in each interpretation I with
domain D that interprets (at least) all predicates of the ϕi that are not any of the
Pj , such a set of rules defines a fixpoint operator FIS that takes an “old” tuple of
interpretations
(PJ1 , . . . , P
J
n ) ∈ 2D
|x1| × · · · × 2D|xn|
of the fixpoint predicates and maps it to a new such tuple (PJ
′
1 , . . . , P
J′
n ) in the fol-
lowing way.
Definition 3 For a set S of fixpoint equations of form (4) and an interpretation I for
(at least) all the predicates of S different from the fixpoint predicates Pj , the operator
FIS maps each interpretation J for the predicates Pj to the interpretation J ′ that
interprets each Pj by Sat(ϕj , I ∪ J).
Ultimately, however, it is only the predicate Pi that we are interested in: the formula
(3) is satisfied if and only if t belongs to PJ
∞
i , where J
∞ is the least fixpoint of this
operator FIS .
In our version of simultaneous least-fixpoint logic FO(SLFP), we will also allow
positively nested occurrences of the least-fixpoint operator, i.e., the formulas ϕi may
themselves again contain lfp-expressions, as long as these do not appear in the scope of
a negation. This too does not increase the expressivity of the logic, and removing such
nestings is again simply a matter of increasing the arities of the fixpoint predicates
[18].
We will call a simultaneous least-fixpoint expression guarded if and only if all of the
formulas ϕi and predicates Pj satisfy the condition of Def. 1, i.e., if the ϕi are guarded
formulas in which the Pj do not appear as guards. Translating a guarded simultaneous
fixpoint formula into FO(LFP) preserves its guardedness. Therefore, it now suffices
to show that we can translate guarded FO(ID) to guarded FO(SLFP). The crux of
this transformation lies in the following characterization of the limit of a well-founded
induction sequence as the least-fixpoint of a certain operator.
It was shown in [5] that defining the semantics of a definition ∆ in FO(ID) as
the limit of an induction sequence is equivalent to using the well-founded model of
∆ [23]. Let us briefly recall how the well-founded model is usually defined. There is
a strong duality between three-valued interpretations and pairs (I, J) of two-valued
interpretations for which I ≤ J , in the sense that P I ⊆ PJ for each predicate P .
To be more concrete, to such a pair (I, J) we associate the following three-valued
interpretation τ(I, J).
– If both P I(a) = t and PJ (a) = t then P τ(I,J) also maps a to t.
– Similarly, if both P I(a) = f and PJ (a) = f then P τ(I,J) also maps a to f .
– If P I(a) = f and PJ (a) = t then P τ(I,J) maps a to u.
We will refer to pairs (I, J) for which I ≤ J as consistent pairs. τ is a one-to-one
mapping between consistent pairs and three-valued interpretations.
For a definition ∆ and an interpretation O for ∆’s open symbols, let us now define a
function UO∆ that takes as arguments a consistent pair I, J of two-valued interpretations
such that I|Op(∆) = O = J |Op(∆). In fact, whenever we superscript a function with
such an interpretation O, we will implicitly assume that the domain of this function is
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restricted to interpretations I for which I|Op(∆) = O, or to tuples thereof. We define
UO∆ as mapping (I, J) to the following two-valued interpretation K: P
K(a) = t if and
only if ∆ contains a rule ∀x P (x)← ϕ(x) such that ν(ϕ(a)) = t with ν = τ(I, J).
This function UO∆ is monotone in its first argument, and anti-monotone in its sec-
ond. Let us now consider the operator UO∆ (·, J) that we obtain by keeping the second
argument J of UO∆ fixed, i.e., U
O
∆ (·, J) maps each interpretation I to UO∆ (I, J). Because
UO∆ is monotone in its first argument, each operator U
O
∆ (·, J) is monotone. Tarski’s fix-
point theorem implies that each monotone operator — and therefore every operator
UO∆ (·, J) — has a least fixpoint. For each J , let us denote this least fixpoint by STO∆ (J),
i.e.,
STO∆ (J) = lfp(U
O
∆ (·, J)).
The function STO∆ is now itself again an operator on the lattice of interpretations
extending O. Because UO∆ is anti-monotone in its second argument, this operator ST
O
∆
is anti-monotone, i.e., for all J ≤ J ′,
STO∆ (J) = lfp(U
O
∆ (·, J)) ≥ lfp(UO∆ (·, J ′)) = STO∆ (J ′).
This anti-monotonicity implies that if we take a consistent pair (I, J), i.e., one such
that I ≤ J , then the following pair of interpretations
(STO∆ (J), ST
O
∆ (I)) (5)
is again consistent. Let us denote by SO∆ the operator that maps each consistent pair of
interpretations (I, J) to this new consistent pair (5). The one-to-one mapping τ allows
us to equivalently view SO∆ as an operator on three-valued interpretations. It can be
shown that SO∆ is monotone w.r.t. the precision order ≤p on three-valued interpreta-
tions (to be more precise, whenever (I, J) and (I ′, J ′) are such that τ(I, J) ≤p τ(I ′, J ′),
then τ(SO∆(I, J)) ≤p τ(SO∆(I, J))). As a consequence, Tarksi’s fixpoint theorem im-
plies that it has a least fixpoint (V,W ). The corresponding three-valued interpretation
τ(V,W ) is called the well-founded model of ∆ given O. [5] showed that the limit of
each induction sequence of ∆ in O is precisely the well-founded model of ∆ given O.
If ∆ is total, then, by definition, it must be the case that V = W . It can easily
be seen that in this case V (and W ) is also the least fixpoint of the square (STO∆ )
2
that maps each I to STO∆ (ST
O
∆ (I)). Our transformation of FO(ID) to FO(SLFP) now
exploits precisely this fact, by constructing a lfp-expression that produces this least
fixpoint lfp((STO∆ )
2). Essentially, this transformation therefore provides an encoding
of the alternation fixpoint construct of [23]. It proceeds as follows.
Let ∆ be an FO(ID)-definition of the following form:
8><>:
∀x1 P1(x1)← ϕ1
· · ·
∀xn Pn(xn)← ϕn
9>=>;
in which every predicate is defined by a single rule, i.e., Pi 6= Pj for all i 6= j. (Recall
that a set of rules with the same predicate in the head can always be replaced by a
single rule whose body is the disjunction of the bodies of the original rules.)
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For each Pi, let P
′
i be a new predicate symbol. For each i, let ϕ
′
i be the result
of replacing all positive occurrences of an atom Pj(t) in ϕi by P
′
j(t). Let S be the
following system of fixpoint equations:8><>:
∀x1 P ′1(x1)← ϕ′1
· · ·
∀xn P ′n(xn)← ϕ′n
9>=>;
The following correspondence between this system of equations and the operator STO∆
now follows directly from its definition.
Lemma 1 Let I be an interpretation for Def(∆) ∪ Op(∆). With S the above system
of equations, we have that:
I |=
n^
i=1
∀x Pi(xi)⇔ [lfpP ′iS](xi) if and only if I|Def(∆) = ST
I|Op(∆)
∆ (I).
Proof Let O be I|Op(∆). It suffices to show that UO∆ (·, I) is identical to FIS , because this
will obviously imply that also lfp(UO∆ (·, I)) = STO∆ (I) is equal to lfp(FIS). Let J be an
interpretation for Def(∆). The operator UO∆ (J, I) now produces a new interpretation
for Def(∆) by evaluating the bodies of the rules of ∆ as follows.
– Open predicates are interpreted by O = I|Op(∆).
– Negative occurrences of defined predicates are interpreted by I.
– Positive occurrences of defined predicates are interpreted by J .
Let us compare this to FIS(J), which produces a new interpretation for the fixpoint
predicates P ′ of S by evaluating:
– the non-fixpoint predicates by I;
– the fixpoint predicates P ′i by J .
Because the transformation has replaced precisely the positive occurrences of a defined
predicate Pi by P
′
i , it is now obvious that these two operators do the same thing.
To construct the least fixpoint of the square (STO∆ )
2, we need a fixpoint expression
that it is slightly more complicated still. For each i, we define ϕ′′i as the result of
replacing each negative occurrence of an atom Pj(t) in ϕi by the expression [lfpP ′jS](t).
Let S′ be the following system of fixpoint equations:8><>:
∀x1 P1(x1)← ϕ′′1
· · ·
∀xn Pn(xn)← ϕ′′n
9>=>;
Theorem 3 Assume that ∆ is a total definition. Let I be an interpretation for Def(∆)∪
Op(∆). With S′ the above system of equations, we have that:
I |=
n^
i=1
∀x Pi(xi)⇔ [lfpPiS′](xi) if and only if I |= ∆
Before proving this theorem, let us examine a small example.
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Example 1 We consider the following FO(ID) definition.(
∀x P (x)←¬Q(x).
∀x Q(x)←Q(x).
)
This translates to:
∀x P (x)⇔
„
[lfpP
8><>:
P (x)← ¬[lfpQ′
(
P ′(x)←¬Q(x)
Q′(x)←Q′(x)
)
](x)
Q(x)← Q(x)
9>=>;](x)
«
∧ ∀x Q(x)⇔
„
[lfpQ
8><>:
P (x)← ¬[lfpQ′
(
P ′(x)←¬Q(x)
Q′(x)←Q′(x)
)
](x)
Q(x)← Q(x)
9>=>;](x)
«
Taking a domain consisting of a single object A, the well-founded model of this example
in that domain says that P (A) is t, while Q(A) is f. Intuitively, this conclusion can be
reached in the following way.
1. If we assume that P (A) and Q(A) are both false, we are sure to be underestimating
their actual truth value. By applying this assumption to only the negative occur-
rences of these atoms in a formula, we are sure to be overestimating the effect that
their actual truth value would have on this formula. For instance, assuming that
Q(A) is false will lead us to believe that ¬Q(A) is true.
2. By applying this assumption to all negative occurrences of atoms in the bodies of
the rules of a definition, we end up with a positive definition (i.e., one which now no
longer has any negative occurrence of atoms, and of which we can therefore simple
construct a least fixpoint) that is sure to overestimate the truth of all atoms. In
this case, it will be (
P (A)←¬f
Q(A)←Q(A)
)
and its least fixpoint says that P (A) is true and Q(A) is false.
3. If we now apply this overestimate to the negative occurrences of atoms in rule bodies
of the original definition, we end up with an underestimating positive definition.
In this case, the overestimate says that P (A) is true and Q(A) is false, so the
underestimating definition is that(
P (A)←¬f
Q(A)←Q(A)
)
4. The least fixpoint of this underestimating definition now provides a new, greater
underestimate for the truth of the atoms, which we can plug in again in step 1, and
repeat until a fixpoint is reached. In this case, this greater underestimate says that
P (A) is true and Q(A) is false, which is the same as the overestimate we already
had in point 2 and hence the fixpoint.
The nested lfp expressions above now simulates this process as follows.
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1. The first iteration of the outer lfp starts by assuming that its fixpoint predicates
P and Q have an empty interpretation, i.e., that P (A) and Q(A) are false, as in:8><>:
P (A)← ¬[lfpQ′
(
P ′(A)←¬f
Q′(A)←Q′(A)
)
](A)
Q(A)← f
9>=>;
2. Under this interpretation for P and Q, the inner lfp expression then construct the
least fixpoint of P ′ and Q′, which says that P ′(A) is true and Q′(A) is false;
3. The body of the first rule of the outer lfp expression then singles out Q′ from this
least fixpoint computed by the inner expression and check whether A belongs to
it. It does not, so the body of this rule evaluates to true:(
P (A)← ¬f
Q(A)← f
)
4. Therefore, this first iteration produces that P (A) is true and Q(A) is false, which
is then plugged in as an interpretation for P and Q to start the second iteration
of the outer expression. Again, the reader can verify that this second iteration will
again produce the same result, which is therefore the least fixpoint.
The following proof now formally establishes the correctness of this translation.
Proof (Proof (of Theorem 3)) It follows from Lemma 1 and the construction of S′ that,
in each structure O, the expression [lfpPiS
′] is in fact constructing the least fixpoint
of the operator — let us call it ΓO — that maps each I to ΓO(I) = UO∆ (I, ST
O
∆ (I)).
We now show that this coincides with the least fixpoint of the square (STO∆ )
2, which,
under the assumption of totality, is known to be equal to the well-founded model of ∆
given O. Therefore, this will suffice to prove the desired equivalence.
First, we remark that all fixpoints I of (STO∆ )
2 are also fixpoints of ΓO: because
each such I is by definition the least fixpoint of U(·, STO∆ (I)), it is a fortiori also a
fixpoint, which means that I = U(I, STO∆ (I)). Let I be lfp((ST
O
∆ )
2) and let J be
lfp(ΓO). We will show that I = J . Being a fixpoint of (STO∆ )
2, I is also a fixpoint of
ΓO, so I ≥ J .
On the other hand, J is by construction a fixpoint of ΓO, so J = ΓO(J) =
UO∆ (J, ST
O
∆ (J)). Therefore, J is also a fixpoint of the operator U
O
∆ (·, STO∆ (J)) and,
hence, must be greater than the least fixpoint of this operator, i.e., J ≥ lfp(UO∆ (·, STO∆ (J)) =
(STO∆ )
2(J), or in other words, J is a prefixpoint of (STO∆ )
2. Because Tarski’s theorem
implies that the least fixpoint of a monotone operator is also its least prefixpoint, we
know that for the least fixpoint I of (STO∆ )
2, it is the case that I ≤ J . Having shown
in the previous paragraph that also I ≥ J , we conclude I = J .
This theorem shows how we can, in general, transform FO(ID) into FO(SLFP).
However, if we look at the formulas that are used in this translation:
∀x Pi(xi)⇔ [lfpPiS′](xi)
we see that these are not guarded (even if all formulas in S′ are guarded). Therefore,
they are unsuitable for our purposes. Our solution to this problem will be to avoid
having to assert the equivalence between the defined predicate symbols Pi and their
definitions, by simply replacing all of the predicate symbols Pi by their definition.
However, this can only work if there are no cyclic dependencies between predicates
defined in different definitions.
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Definition 4 An FO(ID) theory T is acyclic if the definitions of T can be ordered as
(∆1, . . . , ∆n), such that none of the defined predicates of ∆i appear in a definition ∆j
for which j < i.
Note that this condition implies that each predicate is defined by at most one
definition. Moreover, it ensures that we can recursively replace defined predicates P by
their unique definition without potentially running into infinite loops.
We also remark that this condition applies to predicates defined by different def-
initions, whereas the condition of no negative dependency-cycles that we imposed in
Def. 2 to ensure totality applies within a single definition.
Putting all of this together, we now define the guarded fragment of FO(ID) as
follows.
Definition 5 An FO(ID) theory T is (loosely) guarded if all the following conditions
are satisfied.
– Each definition in T is (loosely) guarded (Def. 2).
– Each FO formula in T is (loosely) guarded.
– No defined predicates (i.e., predicates that belong to Def(∆) of some definition ∆
of T ) are used as guards.
– T is acyclic (Def. 4).
We now have all the elements necessary for our transformation. Recall that, above,
we presented a translation of an FO(ID) definition ∆ into a set eq(∆) of fixpoint
equations. In more detail, for each ∆ of the form:8><>:
∀x1 P1(x1)← ϕ1
· · ·
∀xn Pn(xn)← ϕn
9>=>;
we constructed eq(∆) as: 8><>:
∀x1 P1(x1)← ϕ′′1
· · ·
∀xn Pn(xn)← ϕ′′n
9>=>;
where each ϕ′′i was the result of replacing each negative occurrence of an atom Pj(t)
in ϕi by:
[lfpP ′j
8><>:
∀x1 P ′1(x1)← ϕ′1
· · ·
∀xn P ′n(xn)← ϕ′n
9>=>;](t)
where each ϕ′i is the result of replacing all positive occurrences of an atom Pj(t) in ϕi
by P ′j(t).
We now translate a (loosely) guarded FO(ID) theory T into an FO(SLFP) theory
s(T ) as follows.
Definition 6 For a (loosely) guarded FO(ID) theory T , we define the corresponding
FO(SLF) theory s(T ) as the result of:
– recursively replacing all atoms P (t), such that P is defined by the (unique) defini-
tion ∆, by the least fixpoint expression [lfpP eq(∆)](t);
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– subsequently removing all definitions from T .
We now obtain the following result.
Theorem 4 The (loosely) guarded fragment of FO(ID) is decidable.
Proof It follows from Theorem 3 and the fact that the transformation steps of Definition
6 are equivalence preserving that a (loosely) guarded FO(ID) theory T is equivalent
to the (loosely)guarded FO(LFP) theory s(T ). The known results for FO(LFP) [10]
therefore imply that (loosely) guarded FO(ID) is indeed decidable.
The 2exptime upperbound of the (loosely) guarded fragment of FO(LFP) does not
directly carry over, however, because the transformation s may exponentially increase
the size of the theory. This proof therefore only allows us to say that the complexity
is at most triple exponential—an upperbound which may or may not be tight.
Having found a decidable fragment of FO(ID), we now examine how this gives rise
to a corresponding decidable fragment of ALCI(ID).
Definition 7 We say that a role R (or concept C) is defined in an ALCI(ID) theory
T if T contains a formula of the form R
.
= ϕ (or C
.
= ϕ) or a definition in which a rule
R ← ϕ (or C ← ϕ) appears. An ALCI(ID) theory is loosely guarded if it is the case
that:
– for every construct ∃R.C that appears in T , R is either an atomic role that is not
defined, or a conjunction of roles R1 u · · · uRn such that at least one of the Ri is
an atomic role that is not defined;
– for every construct ∀R.C that appears in T , R is an atomic role that is not defined;
– for every construct R.S that appears in T , both R and S must be atomic roles that
are not defined, or the inverse of such a role;
– for every inclusion C1 v C2, C1 must be an atomic concept that is not defined, or
a conjunction of such concepts;
– there are no definitions in which predicates depend negatively on each other;
– the theory is acyclic (Def. 4).
It is easy to see that, if all these conditions are satisfied, the corresponding FO(ID)
theory, as defined in Section 4, is loosely guarded.
Lemma 2 For every loosely guarded ALCI(ID) theory T , it holds that the translation
s(〈T 〉) of T into FO(LFP) is a loosely guarded theory that is equivalent to T .
Proof A loosely guarded ALCI(ID) theory T satisfies the five conditions enumerated
in Definition 7. The last item in this list ensures that we can actually perform the trans-
formation of replacing each defined predicate by its unique definition. Therefore, we
can effectively construct s(〈T 〉). Moreover, the fourth condition ensures the equivalence
to the original theory T , as shown in Theorem 3.
Therefore, it suffices to show that all quantifiers that appear in the FO(ID) theory
〈T 〉 are indeed properly guarded. Consulting the relevant tables in section 4 reveals
that quantifiers can be introduced in the following ways.
– Each concept inclusion axiom C v D introduces a single universal quantifier; the
concept C is the only potential guard for this quantifier.
22
– The ∀R.C and ∃R.C constructs introduce a universal and existential quantifier,
respectively, that could potentially be guarded by R.
– TheR1.R2 construct introduces an existential quantifier that can be loosely guarded
by the conjunction of R1 and R2.
Recall that the guarded fragment of FO(LFP) allows all predicates to serve as guards
apart from fixpoint predicates. This means that, for each of these cases, if the “potential
guard”, as we called it, is not a defined predicate, it will actually be a proper guard of
the formula. The first three conditions in the list of Definition 7 now ensure precisely
this fact.
Consequently, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5 The guarded fragment of ALCI(ID) is decidable.
The guarded fragment of ALCI(ID) is a straightforward analogue of the guarded
fragment of FO(LFP) and is, therefore, one of the most obvious candidates for devel-
oping a guarded fragment of ALCI(ID). However, it remains to be seen how useful it
is in practice.
For instance, our representation of the game in Section 5 falls outside this fragment.
The main problem here lies in formulas such as:
Disappears
.
= Chosen unionsq ∃InColourGroup.Chosen
The role InColourGroup is not a valid guard here, because our theory also contains
a definition for this role; moreover, because InColourGroup is meant to represent
a “reachability”-relation, we really have no alternative but to include an inductive
definition for it.
This seems to suggest that, maybe, this guarded fragment is not the decidable
fragment that is the most suited for capturing the interesting features of FO(ID). In
a currently ongoing research project, other decidable fragments of FO(ID) are being
constructed. In particular, efforts are being made to derive such fragments from Bu¨chi’s
decidability result for monadic second order logic in the natural numbers [3]. Once
completed, this research will induce other decidable fragments for ALCI(ID), which
might provide a better match with the typical modeling style it inherits from FO(ID).
Nevertheless, the next section presents an example that is covered by the guarded
fragment we have developed here.
7 A Second Example: Conference management
While the example given in Section 5 illustrates the new features offered by our lan-
guage, it is perhaps not very evocative from a Semantic Web perspective. [8] uses a
running example that could easily be envisioned as part of an online conference man-
agement system such as EasyChair. We will briefly outline how this example can be
represented in our language.
There are a number of papers (belonging to a concept Paper), which are assigned
keywords (the role AssignedTo(Keyword, Paper)). The keywords are clustered into
sets of similar keywords (Similar(Keyword,Keyword)). There are also people, who
can be experts in certain areas (ExpertIn(Person,Area)). We assume to have some
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DL-knowledge base which provides information about these concepts and roles. This
may be just a list of facts such as
ExpertIn(IanHorrocks, SemanticWeb),
but it may also derive the knowledge from, say, a publication database.
[8] then proceeds to build an ASP-layer on top of the existing DL theory. In our
case, we achieve the same effect by adding some useful ALCI(ID) definitions to the
knowledge base.
First, we add the assumption that whenever some keyword (e.g., “OWL”) is as-
signed to a paper, all similar keywords (e.g., “Web Ontology Language”) also pertain
(PertainsTo(Keyword, Paper)) to it.(
PertainsTo← AssignedTo
PertainsTo← Similar.PertainsTo
)
(6)
Without making this more precise, [8] also assumes that the knowledge base some-
how assigns a paper to a specific area (InArea(Paper,Area)) based on the keywords
that pertain to it. In our case, we can imagine this being done, for instance, using a
predicate KeywordFor(Keyword,Area) and the following definition:
InArea
.
= PertainsTo−.KeywordFor (7)
We can then define those people who are good candidate reviewers for a paper as
those who are experts in the area of the paper:
GoodCandidateFor
.
= ExpertIn.InArea− (8)
The goal of reviewer assignment is to assign a good candidate to each paper
(Assigned(Paper,Reviewer)). A PC chair might therefore be interested in querying
those problematic papers that have not yet been assigned a good candidate:
Problematic
.
= Paper u ¬∃(Assigned uGoodCandidateFor).P erson (9)
This theory does not fall in the guarded fragment of ALCI(ID), because defined
predicates appear as guards in various places. Again, this is not necessarily problematic:
if we have a fixed set of n papers that is to be divided among m reviewers, then this
provides a fixed and finite domain context, in which we can easily compute the set of
problematic papers for a given assignment. By adding also the following restriction to
the theory:
Problematic v ⊥ (10)
we can compute whether an assignment without problematic papers is possible. This is
again a model expansion task, whereAssignedTo(Keyword, Paper), Similar(Keyword,
Keyword),KeywordFor(Keyword,Area) and ExpertIn(Person,Area) are given, and
Assigned(Paper,Reviewer) needs to be computed.
In addition to these closed world reasoning tasks, a conference management system
might also need to perform open world reasoning. For instance, while submissions are
still in progress and reviewers are still being added to the system, we might very well be
interested to know which papers are already certainly (un-)problematic given a current
partial set of assignments. Unfortunately, the guarded fragment of ALCI(ID) does not
provide us with any guarantees that this task will be decidable.
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A possible work-around is to introduce for each paper p a separate conceptAssignedTop
that contains just those keywords that were assigned to p, a separate concept Pertainsp
that contains only those keywords pertaining to p, and so on.(
Keywordp ← ∃Similar.Keywordp
Keywordp ← AssignedTop
)
Areap
.
= ∃KeywordFor.Keywordp
Candidatep
.
= ∃ExpertIn.Areap
This theory now is guarded, with Similar, KeywordFor and ExpertIn serving as
guards. To figure out whether p is a problematic paper, we can then add also:
Candidatep uAssignedp v ⊥
In this way, we will be able to reason with the existence of unknown reviewers, though
not with unknown papers, since each paper requires its own set of concepts. Of course,
even here the guardedness still depends on the assumption that the rest of the theory
does not define any of the concepts Similar, KeywordFor or ExpertIn.
8 Related Work
In this section, we discuss several related approaches. For clarity, we divide them into
a number of different categories, the first being that of hybrid languages.
8.1 Hybrid languages
In [6], a combination of DL and LP under the well-founded semantics is investi-
gated, while dl-programs [8] combine DL and Answer Set Programming (ASP). Unlike
FO(ID)’s semantic integration, these two approaches foster a strong separation between
the LP and DL components: essentially, they allow a logic program to pose queries to
a description logic theory, with the latter acting as a black box towards the former. In
contrast, FO(ID) provides a full integration, in which both rules and description logic
axioms are first-class citizens.
While hybrid systems offer flexibility and are often also easy to implement using
off-the-shelf technology, they are not particularly satisfactory from a knowledge rep-
resentation point of view. They do not shed much light on the semantical relation
between the two languages or on how they might complement each other. Moreover,
since the languages are never truly integrated, a hybrid theory cannot be thought of as
a single piece of knowledge—a single mental model of some reality—but must always
be considered as two different pieces of knowledge that interact according to some spe-
cific interface. One illustration of this is that, in [8], disjunctive information from a DL
knowledge base is lost to the ASP program. For instance, a hybrid theory containing
DL-statements Person v Woman unionsqMan and Person(Alex), together with an ASP
program:
∀x P (x)← DL[Woman](x).
∀x P (x)← DL[Man](x).
does not actually imply P (Alex), because the DL knowledge base cannot derive either
Woman(Alex) or Man(Alex).
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8.2 Layered integrations
This section discusses the language of r-hybrid rules [21], which was later extended
to DL+log [22], and to g-hybrid knowledge bases [12], which uses a transformation to
guarded open answer set programs [13] to prove decidability.
Unlike e.g. dl-programs, r-hybrid rules offer a semantic integration of DL and LP.
However, even though there is no longer a strict, syntactical separation between the
two components, the approach is, at the semantical level, still essentially a layered one,
in which an ASP program is added on top of a DL knowledge base. This can clearly be
seen in the semantics of the language, which proceeds according to a two-step process.
First, the predicates that appear in the DL part of the theory are considered in isolation;
afterwards, they are “projected” out of the theory, leaving only an ASP program. To
be more precise, an interpretation I is an NM-model of a combined theory (K,P ) if:
1. the restriction of I to the DL predicates is a model (in the standard sense) of the
DL knowledge base K;
2. the restriction of I to the rule predicates is an answer set of the program that
results from replacing in P all DL predicates by their truth value according to I.
This language is therefore less hybrid than dl-programs, in the sense that the integra-
tion is done directly on the semantical level, rather than by having one component
query the other. However, it is still a layered approach, in which a crisp distinction is
made between DL-predicates and rule predicates. For an example of what this means,
consider the following two rules:
Person(x)←Man(x)
Person(x)←Woman(x)
In a regular logic program (as well as in an inductive definition), these two rules would
imply, in the absence of any other rules with Person in their head, that each person
is either a man or a woman. In DL+log, they will mean the same thing, but only if
Person does not appear in the DL part of the theory. If, on the other hand, there is
for instance a fact Person(Bob) in the DL ABox, then Person will be interpreted as a
DL predicate and the meaning of these two rules will be different: the theory will then
have a model in which Bob is a person but neither a man nor a woman.
By contrast, FO(ID) and ALCI(ID) do not make any distinction between DL and
rule predicates; a definition (
Person←Man
Person←Woman
)
always implies that a person must be either a man or a woman, regardless of how or
where the predicates that appear in it are used in the rest of the theory.
8.3 Full integrations
One of the most widely known languages to combine DL with rules is that of SWRL
[14], which offers a full (non-hybrid and non-layered) integration of the two. SWRL
extends OWL with Horn clauses under the regular FO semantics. One of the limitations
of SWRL is that its rules can only be used to state sufficient conditions, and not
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necessary ones. As a consequence, SWRL rules cannot be used to define concepts.
Because definitions are such an important feature of DL (see footnote on p.3), this is a
curious lack. ALCI(ID), by contrast, also allows (in addition to the regular first-order
implication w) the definitional rule construct←, which can be used to define concepts,
even inductively. Moreover, it also allows more than just Horn clauses, since the body
of a rule may contain negation and quantifiers.
While SWRL itself is undecidable, many decidable fragments exists. For instance,
there is the fragment of (strongly) safe rules [20]: a SWRL-rule (i.e., Horn clause) is safe
if every one of its variables appears in an atom whose predicate is not used anywhere
in the TBox (i.e., it may only appear in other rules or in the ABox). Description
logic programs [11], which were actually developed prior to SWRL itself, form another
decidable fragment of SWRL.
There also exists a number of full integrations that, like ALCI(ID), offer more
expressive languages. In particular, [19] uses an embedding into MKNF to achieve this,
while [2] uses the first-order version of auto-epistemic logic FO-AEL. These approaches
are similar to ours in that they also start from a very expressive language and then
consider various interesting fragments of these languages. Moreover, like FO(ID), both
MKNF and FO-AEL are extensions of classical propositional/first-order logic.
The main difference to our approach lies in the nature of this extension: FO(ID)
extends classical logic with inductive definitions, whereas MKNF and FO-AEL both
extend classical logic with modal operator(s). Modal operators represent statements
about knowledge or possibility, which inherently refer to a reference class of many
possible worlds, existing side-by-side with the actual world. The semantics of these
languages is therefore naturally defined in terms of sets of interpretations. Inductive
definitions, on the other hand, do not have a modal component and do not refer to
multiple possible worlds. All they do is define the meaning of some predicate(s) in
terms of some other predicate(s), by means of a set of rules that serve as a recipe
to construct one from the other. The formal semantics of FO(ID) is therefore defined
in terms of this constructive process, as it is envisaged by mathematicians writing
down such definitions, and [5] attempts to demonstrate that the formal objects that
FO(ID) uses for this purpose indeed correctly capture the underlying intuitions. FO(ID)
and MKNF/FO-AEL therefore try to achieve different goals by means of different
mathematical constructions. These goals are not mutually exclusive and might even be
complementary: there is nothing a priori impossible or undesirable about developing
a language FO(ID, K, NF) that extends classical logic with both inductive definitions
and modal operators.
This goes back to a point that we already touched upon in the introduction to
this paper; namely, that the question of how to extend DL with rules is not one which
has a single right answer. It all depends on what this extension is meant to achieve.
People who are of the opinion that a key capability missing from DL is that of explicitly
reasoning about knowledge would do well to look into the papers on MKNF or FO-
AEL. People who would like the ability to include more expressive forms of definitions
in a DL theory are hopefully well-served by this paper.
For our part, we have attempted throughout this paper to argue that inductive
definitions are a useful addition to DL. Inductive definitions are well-known to math-
ematicians and computer scientists, and judging from the abundance of inductively
defined concepts in research papers (e.g., reachability, transitive closure, the satisfac-
tion relation |= of first-order logic), they indeed pop up quite often. Inductively defined
relations such as the ancestors of a person or the Google PageRank of a website cannot
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be defined by typical DLs—and the same also holds for certain non-inductive concepts
like being someone’s uncle. In [5], a mathematical theory was developed with the sole
purpose of demonstrating that FO(ID) offers a semantically correct and syntactically
convenient representation of such inductive definitions. Borrowing from this, we there-
fore believe that ALCI(ID) is a useful extension of DL with rules. While the MKNF
and FO-AEL based approaches may very well also be useful extensions of DL with
rules, they ultimately try to a achieve a different goal, which makes them a potential
complement rather than an alternative to our approach. Whether it is possible and/or
desirable to combine them into a joint language that can express both modalities and
inductive definitions is a potential topic for future research.
9 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have investigated the extension of DL with rules that is induced by
FO(ID). We first argued that this is quite natural for the following reasons:
– there is an appealing match between the intuitive notion of a “case” in an inductive
definition and the formal construct of a definitional rule in FO(ID);
– since non-inductive definitions are already a key feature of DL, it makes sense to
exploit this match by adding definitional rules to DL, in order to extend the class
of definitions that can be represented.
Motivated by these arguments, we have defined a fragment ALCI(ID) of FO(ID),
which offers a DL-like syntax for representing (inductive) definitions. For FO(ID), and
therefore also for ALCI(ID), there exist useful inference tasks that can be performed
efficiently; in Section 6, we discussed the task of model expansion, which can be used
to compute the next state of the game we modeled in Section 5. This is despite the fact
that the language as a whole is undecidable for deductive inference. We have defined a
decidable guarded fragment of ALCI(ID). A more comprehensive analysis of this and
other decidable fragments of FO(ID) is left for future work. The goal of the current
paper is not to present a single DL rule-language that is suitable for all purposes, but
rather to point towards FO(ID) in general as an interesting foundation from which
such languages can be derived.
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